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Aristotle on shame and learning to be good

Jimenez, Marta

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자료유형단행본
개인저자Jimenez, Marta.
서명/저자사항Aristotle on shame and learning to be good/ Marta Jimenez.
발행사항Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2020.
형태사항x, 214 p. ; 24 cm.
총서사항Oxford Aristotle studies
ISBN9780198829683 (hbk.)
019882968X (hbk.)
서지주기Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-201) and indexes.
주제명(개인명)AristotleCriticism and interpretation.
일반주제명Shame --Philosophy.
Virtue --Philosophy.
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Marta Jimenez presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle''s account of the role of shame in moral development. Despite shame''s bad reputation as a potential obstacle to the development of moral aut...

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Marta Jimenez presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle''s account of the role of shame in moral development. Despite shame''s bad reputation as a potential obstacle to the development of moral autonomy, Jimenez argues that shame is for Aristotle the proto-virtue of those learning to be good, since it is the emotion that equips them with the seeds of virtue. Other emotions such as friendliness, righteous indignation, emulation, hope, and even spiritedness may play important roles on the road to virtue. However, shame is the only one that Aristotle repeatedly associates with moral progress. The reason is that shame can move young agents to perform good actions and avoid bad ones in ways that appropriately resemble not only the external behavior but also the orientation and receptivity to moral value characteristic of virtuous people.

Through an analysis of the different cases of pseudo-courage and the passages on shame in Aristotle''s ethical treatises, Jimenez argues that shame places young people on the path to becoming good by turning their attention to considerations about the perceived nobility and praiseworthiness of their own actions and character. Although they are not yet virtuous, learners with a sense of shame can appreciate the value of the noble and guide their actions by a genuine interest in doing the right thing. Shame, thus, enables learners to perform virtuous actions in the right way before they possess practical wisdom or stable dispositions of character. This proposal solves a long-debated problem concerning Aristotle''s notion of habituation by showing that shame provides motivational continuity between the actions of the learners and the virtuous dispositions that they will eventually acquire

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목차 일부

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1

0.1 The "Moral Upbringing Gap" and Shame as the Bridge to Virtue 6

0.2 Finding Space for Shame as the Proto-Virtue of the Learner 9

0.3 Plan of the Book 1...

목차 전체

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1

0.1 The "Moral Upbringing Gap" and Shame as the Bridge to Virtue 6

0.2 Finding Space for Shame as the Proto-Virtue of the Learner 9

0.3 Plan of the Book 15

1 Becoming Virtuous by Doing Virtuous Actions 18

1.1 The Problem of the Gap in Moral Development 18

1.2 Learning-by-Doing, Priority Objection, and Virtue Acquisition 19

1.3 The Question about the "How" and the Continuity Principle 23

1.4 Aristotle''s Response to the Priority Objection: General Lines 28

1.5 "Fake It till You Make It": Motivationally-Neutral Accounts 34

1.6 What is Wrong with the Motivationally-Neutral Accounts? 36

1.7 Alternative Account: Bridging the Moral Upbringing Gap 42

1.8 A Plan for the Next Chapters 49

2 Learning through Pleasure, Pain, the Noble, and the Shameful 51

2.1 "Steering the Young through Pleasure and Pain" 51

2.2 The Conditioning View: Transformation through Rewards and Punishments 54

2.3 The Familiarity View: Transformation through Repetition and Becoming Familiar 61

2.4 Burnyeat''s Account: Learning to Enjoy the Pleasures of the Noble 62

2.5 Three Objections against Burnyeat''s View 70

2.6 The Beginning of a Solution 73

3 Pseudo-Virtuous Practices, Pseudo-Virtuous Conditions 77

3.1 Varieties of Pseudo-Virtue 77

3.2 Appearances of Goodness and Errors about Character 79

3.3 Courageous Because of Ignorance: The Lowest Kind of Pseudo-Courage 86

3.4 The Courage of Hopeful Individuals and Drunks 90

3.5 Thumos, Reactivity, and Natural Courage 95

3.6 Experience and Courage: The Case of Skilled Soldiers 103

3.7 Two Kinds of Political Courage and Two Methods of Civic Education 113

4 Connecting Shame with Honor and the Noble 120

4.1 Shame''s Self-Reflectivity, Other-Relatedness, and Responsiveness to External Reasons 120

4.2 Shame, Love of Honor, Virtue, and the Noble 123

4.3 The Standard View of Shame as Mere Desire for Reputation: Two Problems 127

4.4 An Alternative View of Shame and Love of Honor 133

5 The Mixed Nature of Shame 136

5.1 Shame''s Many Faces 136

5.2 The Complexity of Shame and the Alleged Tensions between NE IV 9 and X 9 139

5.3 Two Kinds of Shame as Solution to Shame''s Tensions? 141

5.4 Shame''s Special Status as a Praiseworthy Emotion 148

6 Shame as the Proto-Virtue of the Learners 160

6.1 Moving Non-Virtuous Agents towards Virtue: Aristotle''s Positive View of Shame 160

6.2 Praiseworthy Shame and Young People in NE IV 9 161

6.3 Three Positive Aspects of Shame in NE X 9 170

6.4 Young Lovers of the Noble vs. the Shameless, the Virtuous, and the Timid 176

Conclusion: Shame, Love of the Noble, and Moral Development 185

Bibliography 189

Index of Texts 203

Index of Names 206

Index of Subjects 209

저자소개

Marta Jimenez, Associate Professor, Emory University

Marta Jimenez is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Emory University. Originally from Spain, she was educated in Spain, Germany, the United States, and Canada. Her work focuses mainly on topics related to moral psychology, philosophy of action, theory of emotions, ethics, and political thought in Plato, Aristotle, and the Cynics. She has broader research interests in contemporary ethics, emotion theory, action theory, virtue ethics, and social epistemology.
  

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